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INTRODUCTION 
At the end of the twentieth century, the United States was an 
international outlier in the severity of its juvenile sentencing practices 
despite having invented the juvenile court model one century earlier.1 
Today, juvenile sentencing reform is underway, particularly in the wake 
of recent Supreme Court decisions that have cabined the states’ capacity 
to impose extreme sentences on juveniles. In this Article, I propose two 
additional reform measures that would help to rationalize the sentences 
imposed on children in the American criminal justice system—one on 
the front end of the system and one on the back end. In particular, on the 
front end, in states where life without parole (LWOP) is still a lawful 
sentence for a juvenile homicide defendant, courts should ensure that 
children facing that sentence are afforded procedural safeguards akin to 
those recommended for adults who face the death penalty. On the back 
end, executive actors should install juvenile-specific clemency 
boards—what I have called Miller Commissions—to give children 
serving lengthy sentences a second look. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I describes the extent and 
nature of children in the American criminal justice system today. With 
this context, Part II suggests that juvenile justice reform is underway in 
* Associate Professor of Law, Columbus School of Law, The Catholic
University of America. Special thanks to all those who participated in the Wisconsin Law 
Review 2014 Symposium and to its student members for their organizational and editorial 
efforts.  
1. See infra note 2 and accompanying text.
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part because of collective agreement that policies of the late twentieth 
century were misguided and, in great part, because of the moral 
leadership of the Supreme Court in its recent juvenile sentencing 
decisions. Part III offers two additional reform measures that are timely 
and defensible in light of the Court’s recent decisions: enhanced 
procedural safeguards for children facing LWOP and clemency 
provisions tailored to youth serving long sentences. 
I. KIDS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
Historically, the United States has been a leader in juvenile justice 
policy. The first juvenile justice system was created in Illinois in 1899, 
and every state in the Union followed suit by instituting a separate 
system for children accused of a crime or deemed delinquent.2 Prompted 
by Progressive-era reforms,3 the early American juvenile courts shared 
several notable features: a degree of informality relative to criminal court 
proceedings, judicial discretion regarding the appropriate intervention for 
each child, and an animating belief that childhood is a period of 
dependency during which the state has an obligation to help a child in 
jeopardy.4 Developed countries around the world have installed juvenile 
justice systems modeled after this early American approach to children.5 
Unfortunately, in a relatively short period of time, the United States 
went from being a leader on the juvenile justice front to being an 
international outlier in its harsh treatment of juveniles. By the late 1950s 
and until the end of the twentieth century, politicians almost uniformly 
assumed a tough-on-crime stance and codified an ever-growing and 
ever-harsher set of penal laws.6 At the same time, determinate sentencing 
schemes and transfer laws made it increasingly common for children to 
be tried in adult court and exposed to generally applicable mandatory 
minimum sentences.7 Until 2005, the United States was the only 
2. Franklin E. Zimring & David S. Tanenhaus, Introduction to CHOOSING THE
FUTURE FOR AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE 1 (Franklin E. Zimring & David S. Tanenhaus 
eds., 2014). 
3. AARON KUPCHIK, JUDGING JUVENILES 10–11 (2006).
4. Id. at 51; FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE 6–7 (2005).
5. Zimring & Tanenhaus, supra note 2, at 1; see also ZIMRING, supra note 4, at
33 (“No legal institution in Anglo-American legal history has achieved such universal 
acceptance among the diverse legal systems of the industrial democracies.”). 
6. Marc Mauer, Why Are Tough on Crime Policies So Popular?, 11 STAN. L.
& POL’Y REV. 9, 10–11 (1999); see also Kimberley D. Bailey, Watching Me: The War on 
Crime, Privacy and the State, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1539, 1544–48 (2014) (describing 
the evolution of the war on crime from the 1950s through the 1990s).  
7. KUPCHIK, supra note 3, at 154–59 (discussing the three primary methods for
transfer of jurisdiction from juvenile to adult court); Special Report to the Congress: 
Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the Federal Criminal Justice System, U.S. SENT’G 
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developed country that subjected children to the death penalty,8 and 
today we are the only nation that continues to sentence children to 
LWOP.9 
Moreover, juveniles are regularly processed in the adult criminal 
justice system. Over two million juveniles are arrested each year, and 
approximately 250,000 of those arrests result in criminal cases in adult 
court.10 Just like adults, above and beyond a criminal conviction, these 
juveniles must contend with a host of collateral consequences, including 
lost educational opportunities, limited employment prospects, lifetime 
sex-offender registration, and potential adult sentencing enhancements in 
future criminal trials.11 In sum, children are not an insignificant group 
within the criminal justice system, and they present unique policy issues 
precisely because they are children. 
II. JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM UNDERWAY
By the turn of the twenty-first century, a nascent consensus emerged 
regarding the broken nature of our juvenile justice practices. Crime rates 
overall had been in steady decline for years.12 Criminologists’ 
predictions of a juvenile super-predator population had been debunked.13 
Social and brain science had illuminated the ways in which juveniles are 
COMMISSION, http://www.ussc.gov/news/congressional-testimony-and-reports/
mandatory-minimum-penalties/special-report-congress (last visited Jan. 2, 2015) 
(discussing the trend toward mandatory minimums at the state level from the 1970s on).  
8. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005) (“Our determination that the
death penalty is disproportionate punishment for offenders under 18 finds confirmation in 
the stark reality that the United States is the only country in the world that continues to 
give official sanction to the juvenile death penalty.”).  
9. Brief of Amnesty Int’l, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 2,
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (Nos. 10-9646, 10-9647), 2012 WL 174238. 
10. Ashley Nellis, Addressing the Collateral Consequences of Convictions for
Young Offenders, CHAMPION, July-Aug. 2011, at 20, 20. 
11. See generally id.; see also Michael Pinard, The Logistical and Ethical
Difficulties of Informing Juveniles about the Collateral Consequences of Adjudications, 6 
NEV. L.J. 1111, 1114–15 (2006). 
12. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE GREAT AMERICAN CRIME DECLINE 5–8 (2007)
(documenting the dramatic and consistent decline in both violent and nonviolent crimes 
in the post-World War II era); see also Warren Friedman, Volunteerism and the Decline 
of Violent Crime, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1453, 1453–55 (1998) (describing the 
decline and noting competing explanations). 
13. See ZIMRING, supra note 4, at 120–22; Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence
Steinberg, Social Welfare and Fairness in Juvenile Crime Regulation, 71 LA. L. REV. 35, 
36 n.6 (2010) (noting that the superpredator theory drove policy in the late twentieth 
century, but that even its original proponents have acknowledged its inaccuracy over 
time).  
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less culpable and more amenable to rehabilitation.14 And studies had 
shown that incarceration has a criminogenic effect on youth.15 As 
Professor Elizabeth Scott explains, by the early twenty-first century, 
there had been a marked dissipation of the “moral panic[]” of the 1990s, 
and “[m]any lawmakers and politicians—from the Supreme Court to big 
city mayors—appear[ed] ready to rethink the punitive approach of the 
1990s.”16 
In this context, the Supreme Court tackled the question whether 
states could subject juveniles to the most severe criminal sanctions—the 
death penalty and LWOP. Beginning in 2005, the Court, in a series of 
cases, developed a new Eighth Amendment jurisprudence around the 
concept that “children are constitutionally different,”17 and it 
significantly limited the extent to which states can impose extreme 
sentences on children. First, in Roper v. Simmons,18 the Court held that 
the Eighth Amendment forbids the execution of juveniles, even those 
convicted of homicide crimes.19 Five years later, in Graham v. Florida,20 
the Court held that the Eighth Amendment also precludes a sentence of 
LWOP for juveniles convicted of nonhomicide offenses.21 And most 
recently, in 2012, the Court held in Miller v. Alabama22 that, even when a 
juvenile is convicted of a homicide offense, the states cannot impose 
mandatory LWOP.23 These three decisions together stand for the 
14. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–70 (2005) (discussing
scientific and sociological studies demonstrating that children are less mature and more 
reckless, that youth are more susceptible to outside influence and peer pressure, and that 
personality traits in juveniles are not yet fixed).  
15. See RICHARD A. MENDEL, ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., NO PLACE FOR KIDS:
THE CASE FOR REDUCING JUVENILE INCARCERATION 10–12 (2011), available at http://
www.aecf.org/m/resourcedoc/aecf-NoPlaceForKidsFullReport-2011.pdf (discussing such 
studies and their results); see also Scott & Steinberg, supra note 13, at  
56–60 (discussing studies examining whether more punitive laws and sanctions for 
juveniles reduce recidivism and reaching the opposite conclusion); Christopher Slobogin, 
Treating Juveniles Like Juveniles: Getting Rid of Transfer and Expanded Adult Court 
Jurisdiction, 46 TEX. TECH L. REV. 103, 126–27 (2013) (“Prolonged incarceration is also 
counterproductive. As the research on deterrence implies, prison is criminogenic.
Transfer may keep a troublesome youth off the streets, but it increases the probability that 
youth will turn to crime once back on the streets.”).  
16. Elizabeth S. Scott, Miller v. Alabama and the (Past and) Future of Juvenile
Crime Regulation, 31 LAW & INEQ. 535, 541 (2013). 
17. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012) (“To start with the first set
of cases: Roper and Graham establish that children are constitutionally different from 
adults for purposes of sentencing.”).  
18. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
19. Id. at 578.
20. 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
21. Id. at 74.
22. 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
23. Id. at 2469.
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proposition that children are different in the eyes of the law, and 
sentencing practices must reflect that fact. 
It is hard to overstate the significance of the Roper/Graham/Miller 
line of cases whether one looks at them in terms of methodology,24 
implementation,25 or future implications.26 I have argued elsewhere that 
the Miller decision was truly revolutionary in its logic and scope,27 and 
that it portends significant juvenile justice reform measures.28 Some of 
those measures are already underway. For example, a handful of state 
supreme courts have held that the Miller decision applies retroactively, 
enabling all juveniles currently serving LWOP even for a homicide 
offense to seek a resentencing hearing.29 At the same time, some state 
24. For a discussion of the Court’s methodology in Graham and Miller, see, for
example, Douglas A. Berman, Graham and Miller and the Eighth Amendment’s 
Uncertain Future, 27 CRIM. JUST. 19 (2013). 
25. A number of scholars, myself included, have weighed in on how the Court’s
recent juvenile sentencing decisions ought to be implemented. See, e.g., Cara H. Drinan, 
Graham on the Ground, 87 WASH. L. REV. 51 (2012); Cara H. Drinan, Misconstruing 
Graham & Miller, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 785 (2014) [hereinafter Drinan, Misconstruing]; 
Craig S. Lerner, Sentenced to Confusion: Miller v. Alabama and the Coming Wave of 
Eighth Amendment Cases, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 25 (2012) (identifying challenges of 
implementation and future litigation issues); Lauren Kinell, Note, Answering the 
Unanswered Questions: How States Can Comport with Miller v. Alabama, 13 CONN. 
PUB. INT. L.J. 143 (2013). 
26. Scholars have only begun to explore the future implications of the Court’s
recent decisions in the juvenile sentencing arena. See, e.g., Janet C. Hoeffel, The 
Jurisprudence of Death and Youth: Now the Twain Should Meet, 46 TEX. TECH L. REV. 
29 (2013) (arguing that Miller calls into question current juvenile transfer laws); Shobha 
L. Mahadev, Youth Matters: Roper, Graham, J.D.B., Miller and the New Juvenile 
Jurisprudence, CHAMPION, Mar. 2014, available at https://www.nacdl.org/ 
champion.aspx?id=32599 (articulating plausible extensions of the Court’s recent 
decisions); James Donald Moorehead, What Rough Beast Awaits? Graham, Miller and 
the Supreme Court’s Seemingly Inevitable Slouch Towards Complete Abolition of 
Juvenile Life Without Parole, 46 IND. L. REV. 671 (2013) (arguing that the Court’s 
decisions indicate future abolition of juvenile LWOP altogether); Michael M. O’Hear, 
Not Just Kid Stuff? Extending Graham and Miller to Adults, 78 MO. L. REV. 1087 (2013). 
27. See generally Cara H. Drinan, The Miller Revolution, 101 IOWA L. REV.
(forthcoming 2015) (Soc. Sci. Research Network, Working Paper, 2014), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2475126.  
28. Id.
29. People v. Davis, 6 N.E.3d 709, 722 (Ill. 2014) (holding that Miller
announced a substantive rule that applies retroactively); State v. Mantich, 842 N.W.2d 
716, 732 (Neb. 2014) (same); Diatchenko v. Dist. Att’y for Suffolk Dist., 1 N.E.3d 270, 
276 (Mass. 2013) (same); State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 121–22 (Iowa 2013) 
(same); Jones v. Miss., 122 So. 3d 698, 703 (Miss. 2013) (same); Ex parte Maxwell, 424 
S.W.3d 66, 75 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (same). At the same time, many state supreme 
courts have held otherwise. See infra note 65 and accompanying text. Finally, there is 
also an emerging federal court debate on this question. Compare In re Pendleton, 732 
F.3d 280, 282 (3d Cir. 2013) (finding that prisoner had made prima facie showing that 
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legislatures have passed comprehensive legislation in response to Miller. 
In 2013, Delaware enacted a law that removes children from the reach of 
the state’s mandatory first-degree murder sentence of death or LWOP.30 
Under the new law, a judge will impose a discretionary sentence upon a 
juvenile convicted of first-degree murder; the judge will consider the 
youth-related sentencing factors as outlined by the Miller Court, and she 
will be able to impose up to a life sentence.31 Even in cases in which the 
judge imposes a life sentence for first-degree murder, she may designate 
the juvenile’s sentence as subject to reconsideration after 35 years.32 The 
new law also responds to the Graham Court’s directive by eliminating 
LWOP for juveniles convicted of nonhomicide offenses, and by making 
some inmates eligible for a sentencing modification immediately.33 
Finally, the law permits sentencing courts to order that juvenile sentences 
run concurrently to avoid sentencing a child to a de facto life sentence.34 
This legislation serves as a model for other states, as it reflects not 
simply technical compliance with the Court’s recent juvenile sentencing 
decisions but a rethinking of the way juveniles are treated in the criminal 
justice system. West Virginia has enacted similarly broad legislation in 
response to the Supreme Court’s recent juvenile sentencing decisions,35 
and a handful of additional states have moved to at least reduce—if not 
to eliminate—the sentence of LWOP for children.36 
While these reform efforts are promising, much remains to be done 
on the juvenile justice reform front. In the next Part of this Article, I 
suggest two additional concrete reform measures that are achievable 
given the political climate, and defensible under the Court’s recent 
juvenile sentencing decisions. 
Miller was retroactive), with In re Morgan, 713 F.3d 1365, 1368 (11th Cir. 2013) 
(holding that Miller is not retroactive).  
30. S. 9, 147th Gen. Assemb. (Del. 2013), available at http://
legis.delaware.gov/LIS/LIS147.NSF/vwlegislation/1EA0FC1FD4DF714485257AFC005
2953C. 
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. H.B. 4210, 82nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2014) (making all juveniles
eligible for a parole review after 15 years). 
36. Hawaii Becomes Latest State to Abolish Juvenile Life Without Parole
Sentences, EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE (July 6, 2014), http://www.eji.org/node/924 (citing 
Hawaii, Delaware, West Virginia, Texas, and Wyoming as states that have recently 
eliminated juvenile LWOP); see also Reforms Since Miller, CAMPAIGN FOR FAIR SENT’G 
YOUTH, http://fairsentencingofyouth.org/reforms-since-miller/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2015) 
(demonstrating that 11 states have either eliminated juvenile LWOP or narrowed its 
application in the two years after Miller).  
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III. ADDITIONAL RESPONSES TO MILLER:
PREVENTIVE AND CORRECTIVE MEASURES 
Despite the reform measures already underway in the wake of the 
Miller decision, additional reforms are necessary in order to right the 
course of juvenile justice in this country. In this Part of the Article, I 
suggest two such reforms: 1) procedural safeguards for children facing 
LWOP on par with what is recommended for adults facing execution and 
2) clemency specifically tailored to individuals serving lengthy custodial
sentences for a juvenile offense. 
A. Procedural Safeguards for Children Facing Life Without Parole 
The Miller Court did not preclude the possibility of an LWOP 
sentence for a juvenile homicide defendant; rather, it precluded that 
sentence as part of a mandatory sentencing scheme.37 As such, juveniles 
in more than half the states may still be exposed to the second-harshest 
sentence under law.38 When the state seeks to impose LWOP upon a 
juvenile homicide defendant, state court judges should ensure that 
children facing that sentence have a right to counsel on par with what a 
capital defendant deserves, specifically a team that includes at least a 
mitigation specialist.39 As I explain below, a state court judge would be 
amply justified in doing so based on Supreme Court precedent.40 
First, in capital cases, the Supreme Court has held that adequate 
investigation and presentation of mitigation evidence are required for 
constitutionally effective representation. For example, in Williams v. 
Taylor,41 defense counsel failed to discover and present evidence that 
documented Williams’s extensive childhood abuse and mental 
impairments.42 Applying the Strickland v. Washington43 test, the 
Supreme Court held that counsel’s representation of Williams had been 
deficient and that the inefficacy prejudiced the outcome of his case.44 
37. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012).
38. Id. at 2471 (identifying 29 jurisdictions that made LWOP mandatory for
some juveniles convicted of murder in adult court). 
39. See generally AM. BAR ASS’N, GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND
PERFORMANCE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES (2003), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/death_penalty_repres
entation/2003guidelines.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter AM. BAR ASS’N GUIDELINES]. 
40. I am exploring this concept in greater detail in a forthcoming piece. See
Drinan, supra note 27. 
41. 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
42. Id. at 370.
43. 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (establishing a two-pronged test for claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel).  
44. Williams, 529 U.S. at 398–99.
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Similarly, in Wiggins v. Smith,45 defense counsel failed to put on any 
evidence regarding the defendant’s childhood neglect purportedly for 
strategic reasons.46 Again the Court found that counsel’s failure to 
present such “powerful”47 mitigating evidence prejudiced the outcome of 
the defendant’s case and was ineffective assistance of counsel.48 As 
scholars have recognized, in this line of cases culminating in Wiggins, 
the Court “promoted a longstanding guideline of the ABA—that capital 
counsel thoroughly explore the social background of the defendant—to 
the level of constitutional mandate.”49 
In addition to employing a heightened standard of review in capital 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the Supreme Court recently 
suggested that LWOP for children is tantamount to the death penalty. 
The Graham Court employed its categorical approach in assessing 
Graham’s proportionality challenge—an approach it had previously 
reserved for capital cases.50 In assessing Graham’s challenge, the Court 
noted that LWOP sentences “share some characteristics with death 
sentences” in that “[t]he State does not execute the offender sentenced to 
life without parole, but the sentence alters the offender’s life by a 
forfeiture that is irrevocable.”51 Further, the Graham Court recognized 
that LWOP as applied to children is especially harsh given the 
percentage of his life that a child will service in prison as compared to an 
adult.52 
The Miller Court continued to treat LWOP for children as 
comparable to a death sentence. The majority recognized that, in capital 
cases, the Court “has required sentencing authorities to consider the 
characteristics of a defendant and the details of his offense before 
sentencing him to death.”53 And it noted that, because 
“Graham . . . likened life without parole for juveniles to the death 
penalty itself,” the same individualized sentencing requirement must 
apply when a juvenile faces an LWOP sentence.54 Finally, the Miller 
45. 539 U.S. 510 (2003).
46. Id. at 525.
47. Id. at 534.
48. Id. at 536.
49. See The Supreme Court, 2002 Term: Leading Cases, 117 HARV. L. REV.
226, 282 (2003). 
50. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 60–62 (2010).
51. Id. at 69.
52. Id. at 70. (“Under this sentence a juvenile offender will on average serve
more years and a greater percentage of his life in prison than an adult offender. A 
16-year-old and a 75-year-old each sentenced to life without parole receive the same 
punishment in name only.”) 
53. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2463–64 (2012) (citing Woodson v.
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976)). 
54. Id. at 2463.
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Court explained that youth itself is “more than a chronological fact” and 
may be the most powerful mitigating factor available to a defendant: 
Mandatory life without parole for a juvenile precludes 
consideration of his chronological age and its hallmark 
features—among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to 
appreciate risks and consequences. It prevents taking into 
account the family and home environment that surrounds 
him—and from which he cannot usually extricate himself—no 
matter how brutal or dysfunctional. It neglects the 
circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent of 
his participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer 
pressures may have affected him. Indeed, it ignores that he 
might have been charged and convicted of a lesser offense if 
not for incompetencies associated with youth—for example, 
his inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors 
(including on a plea agreement) or his incapacity to assist his 
own attorneys. . . . And finally, this mandatory punishment 
disregards the possibility of rehabilitation even when the 
circumstances most suggest it.55 
The Court has now married these two lines of precedent—the line 
elevating mitigation to a constitutional requirement for capital defendants 
and the line treating LWOP as tantamount to a death sentence for 
children. Accordingly, state court judges should ensure that, just as in 
capital cases, juveniles facing LWOP receive representation on par with 
best practices for death penalty representation. 
The ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of 
Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases (the Guidelines) provide a good 
starting point for what this kind of juvenile representation might look 
like.56 The Guidelines state that defense counsel in capital cases must 
have sufficient training and expertise in capital representation.57 In 
55. Id. at 2467–68 (citations omitted).
56. See AM. BAR ASS’N GUIDELINES, supra note 39. As this Article was being
edited, the Campaign for the Fair Sentencing of Youth announced the publication of the 
first Trial Defense Guidelines for counsel representing youth who face a life sentence. 
Consistent with the arguments I make herein, the new Guidelines are based, in part, on 
the ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death 
Penalty Cases. To view the new Guidelines, see DEFENSE GUIDELINES FOR CHILD
CLIENTS, THE CAMPAIGN FOR THE FAIR SENT’G OF YOUTH (Mar. 2015), available at 
http://fairsentencingofyouth.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Trial-Defense-Guidelines-
Representing-a-Child-Client-Facing-a-Possible-Life-Sentence.pdf. It remains to be seen 
how courts will deal with the enforcement of these standards when reviewing ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims in the future.  
57. See AM. BAR ASS’N GUIDELINES, supra note 39, Guidelines 5.1, 8.1.
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addition, the Guidelines highlight the importance of mitigation evidence 
in their requirements that defense counsel have sufficient skill in 
investigating and presenting mitigation evidence, as well as experience 
working with expert witnesses, especially mental health experts.58 The 
Guidelines also recognize that, given the complexity of capital cases, 
even qualified defense counsel cannot work alone. Thus, the Guidelines 
describe a “Defense Team,” which includes lead counsel and at least one 
associate counsel, a mitigation specialist, a factual investigator, and at 
least one member trained to screen for mental or psychological disorders. 
Finally, the Commentary to the Guidelines makes clear that the Team 
described in the Standard is a minimum and that lead counsel is 
responsible for ensuring that, if additional skill and expertise are 
required, other members will be added to the team (or if funds are not 
available, the issue is at least preserved for appeal).59  
If juveniles facing LWOP are analogous to adults facing the death 
penalty, as I argued above, then it follows that such juveniles should 
enjoy protections analogous to those set forth in the ABA Guidelines. 
First, juveniles facing an LWOP sentence should have counsel 
experienced in the representation of juveniles and, in particular, juveniles 
facing adult sentences in adult court.60 Second, because of the emphasis 
that the Miller Court placed upon mitigation evidence in juvenile LWOP 
cases, it also makes sense for juveniles to have a defense team 
comparable to that contemplated by the ABA Guidelines for death 
penalty cases. Theoretically, this means that the juvenile’s lawyer should 
have co-counsel, a factual investigator, a mitigation specialist, and some 
team member who is trained to screen for mental health issues.61 Just as 
the Guidelines state that death penalty counsel should retain “any other 
members needed to provide high-quality legal representation,”62 so this is 
true in juvenile LWOP cases. Because of the unique characteristics of 
youth, this may require defense counsel to retain an expert who, for 
example, can testify to the fact that the juvenile brain is not fully 
developed and to the criminogenic effect of incarceration on youth.63 
By ensuring that juveniles facing LWOP have representation on par 
with the ABA’s Guidelines for capital cases, state court judges can 
guarantee that juveniles facing LWOP receive an individualized sentence 
58. See id. Guideline 5.1.
59. See id. Guideline 10.4 Commentary.
60. See generally NAT’L JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., NATIONAL JUVENILE
DEFENSE STANDARDS 21 (2012) (discussing Standard 1.3 “Specialized Training 
Requirements for Juvenile Defense”), available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/ 
NationalJuvenileDefenseStandards2013.pdf. 
61. See AM. BAR ASS’N GUIDELINES, supra note 39, Guideline 10.4(A), (C).
62. See id. Guideline 10.4(C).
63. See id.
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as contemplated by the Miller Court and that the LWOP sentence is 
imposed only in the most extreme cases. This procedural safeguard 
would go a long way toward implementing the vision of the Miller 
Court. 
B. Child-Friendly Clemency 
Even if additional procedural safeguards are made available to 
juveniles facing LWOP at sentencing, there is a need for executive relief 
on the back-end of the sentencing process. To begin, many state 
legislatures have yet to respond to Miller in a comprehensive manner, 
leaving some inmates who may have a claim under Miller in limbo. At 
the same time, state courts are split on the question whether Miller 
applies retroactively. Six state supreme courts—those in Texas, Illinois, 
Massachusetts, Iowa, Mississippi, and Nebraska—have applied the 
decision retroactively.64 Five state supreme courts—those in Michigan, 
Pennsylvania, Minnesota, Louisiana, and Alabama—have held that 
Miller applies only to future juvenile homicide defendants.65 In the latter 
five states, there are approximately 1,200 juveniles serving LWOP.66 
Unless the Supreme Court of the United States holds otherwise,67 these 
1,200 inmates will never have an opportunity to have their 
64. People v. Davis, 6 N.E.3d 709, 722 (Ill. 2014) (holding that Miller
announced a substantive rule that applies retroactively); State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 
107, 117 (Iowa 2013) (same); Diatchenko v. Dist. Att’y for Suffolk Dist., 1 N.E.3d 270, 
281 (Mass. 2013) (same); Jones v. State, 122 So.3d 698, 703 (Miss. 2013) (same); State 
v. Mantich, 842 N.W.2d 716, 731 (Neb. 2014) (same); Ex parte Maxwell, 424 S.W.3d 66,
68 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (same). 
65. Ex Parte Williams, 2015 WL 1388138 (Ala. Mar. 27, 2015) (holding that
Miller does not apply retroactively); State v. Tate, 130 So.3d 829, 841 (La. 2013) (same); 
People v. Carp, 852 N.W.2d 801, 808 (Mich. 2014) (same); Chambers v. State, 831 
N.W.2d 311, 316 (Minn. 2013) (same); Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 81 A.3d 1, 9 (Pa. 
2013) (same). 
66. See How Many People Are Serving in My State?, CAMPAIGN FOR FAIR 
SENT’G YOUTH, http://fairsentencingofyouth.org/reports-and-research/
how-many-people-are-serving-in-my-state/ (last visited Jan. 25, 2015). 
67. The Supreme Court will not address this question until sometime during its
October Term 2015. After declining to review a state supreme court decision holding that 
Miller was not retroactively applicable, Cunningham, 81 A.3d at 6–10, cert. denied, 134 
S. Ct. 2724 (2014), the Supreme Court granted certiorari on the same question, see Toca 
v. Louisiana, 135 S. Ct. 781 (2014), only to have the case mooted by the named
defendant’s release. See generally John Simerman, George Toca, La. Inmate at Center of 
Debate on Juvenile Life Sentences, to Go Free, NEW ORLEANS ADVOCATE, Jan. 30, 2015, 
available at http://www.theneworleansadvocate.com/news/11462053-123/george-toca-
louisiana-inmate-at. Soon thereafter, the Supreme Court granted cert on this question 
again in Montgomery v. Louisiana, see Certiorari—Summary Dispositions, SUPREME
COURT (Mar. 23, 2015), http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/ 
032315zor_b97d.pdf.  
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sentences—which are now unconstitutional—reconsidered absent a grant 
of executive clemency. 
Finally, even if held retroactively applicable, Miller does not reach 
all inmates whose cases one may think deserve reconsideration under the 
Court’s rationale. Consider, for example, a 15-year-old convicted of 
murder and sentenced to 55 years with a mandatory additional 25 years 
for the use of a firearm. That person is now serving an 80-year sentence, 
in part because of a discretionary sentence and in part because of a 
mandatory sentencing enhancement. It is not clear that this 80-year 
sentence is within the Miller Court’s ban on mandatory LWOP sentences 
for juveniles. However, the Roper/Graham/Miller rationale—that kids 
are less culpable and more amenable to rehabilitation—suggests that this 
15-year-old deserves reconsideration of his sentence. 
For all of these reasons, state executive actors should appoint Miller 
Commissions specifically designed to examine the validity of extreme 
sentences for juveniles.68 At a minimum, the charge of these Miller 
Commissions should be to identify all state inmates affected by the 
Graham and Miller decisions, to identify a range of appropriate 
sentences for such inmates, and to make recommendations to the 
governor regarding each inmate. This will ensure evenhanded application 
of constitutional law across the country, and it will afford juveniles relief 
under Miller in an efficient, streamlined manner. 
Once in place, these Commissions could provide secondary 
benefits. That is, Commissions tasked with bringing states into 
compliance with Miller would also be well positioned to review other 
juvenile claims of excessive sentencing, such as the 80-year hypothetical 
sentence described above. Moreover, Miller Commissions would be 
equipped to review the claims of those who are no longer incarcerated 
but who are hampered by the collateral consequences of a juvenile 
conviction. 
In order to accomplish these tasks effectively though, state 
executive actors must provide a clear mandate for Miller Commissions. 
First, because so many states have abolished parole or narrowed its 
application,69 and because clemency grants are rare nationwide,70 
68. I first proposed this idea in an earlier article in which I suggested that these
commissions would be an efficient way for states to comply with the mandate of the 
Miller Court. See Drinan, Misconstruing, supra note 25, at 794. Here, I am developing 
that idea further and suggesting that the role of such Commissions could be broader and 
more ambitious.  
69. See generally Joan Petersilia, Parole and Prison Re-entry in the United
States, 26 CRIME & JUST. 479 (1999) (describing abolition of and limitations on use of 
parole nationwide). 
70. See Adam M. Gershowitz, Rethinking the Timing of Capital Clemency, 113
MICH. L. REV. 1, 4 (2014) (“Over the last half century, clemency has become a rarity. 
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executive actors must articulate the rationale for Miller Commissions and 
be willing to use their bully pulpit to support them. 
Second, executive actors should provide clear criteria for the Miller 
Commissions to employ in their review of juvenile cases. Standard 
criteria for parole and/or early release may provide a starting point. For 
example, relevant variables have historically included: “the offender’s 
participation in prison programs; infractions of prison rules; job 
opportunities upon release; family ties; the seriousness of the original 
offense; expressions of remorse and repentance; the risk of recidivism; 
and the views of victims, community members, prosecutors, or 
sentencing judge.”71 
But Miller Commissions also must undertake a deeper inquiry—at 
least in reviewing cases in which an inmate is serving LWOP. A juvenile 
serving LWOP is already serving a sentence that, as the Miller Court 
explained, should be “uncommon” given everything the Court has said 
“about children’s diminished culpability and heightened capacity for 
change.”72 And, according to the Miller Court, an LWOP sentence may 
only be imposed after an individualized hearing.73 In this sense, the 
Commissions need to undertake something closer to a resentencing 
hearing than a parole hearing. The Miller Court set out factors that 
should be relevant at a juvenile’s individualized hearing, and Miller 
Commissions should employ these factors in their decision making. 
These factors include:  
[C]hronological age and its hallmark features—among them, 
immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and 
consequences[,] . . . family and home environment[,] . . . the 
circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent of 
his participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer 
pressures may have affected him[,] . . . incompetencies 
associated with youth—for example, his inability to deal with 
police officers or prosecutors (including on a plea agreement) 
While there have been more than 1,300 executions since the Supreme Court reinstated 
capital punishment in 1976, there have been only 66 individualized commutations. By 
contrast, in the first half of the twentieth century, 1 out of every 4 or 5 death sentences 
was commuted to life imprisonment.”) (citations omitted); see also Rachel E. Barkow, 
Clemency and the Unitary Executive, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2484586 (describing the decline of federal clemency). 
71. Richard A. Bierschbach, Proportionality and Parole, 160 U. PA. L. REV.
1745, 1750–51 (2012).  
72. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012).
73. Id. at 2475.
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or his incapacity to assist his own attorneys[,] [and capacity for 
rehabilitation].74  
Finally, in asking whether an inmate has undertaken to rehabilitate 
himself, the Commissions must take into account what services have 
actually been made available to the applicant.75 
There is the question of who should serve on Miller Commissions. 
Many jurisdictions do not have parole boards in place that regularly 
review parole applications, let alone parole applications from inmates 
who were convicted as juveniles.76 Scholars are in agreement that boards, 
rather than individuals, tend to make better clemency decisions.77 
Further, there are some accepted best practices in terms of executive 
clemency board composition. Such boards should give equal voice to the 
law enforcement community and to those who advocate for holistic 
criminal justice reform and effective reentry. And such boards should 
reflect diversity in race, ethnicity, and gender.78 Above and beyond these 
general principles, a Commission designed to review the parole and/or 
clemency applications of inmates serving time for a juvenile conviction 
must have expertise regarding juveniles on a variety of fronts. Preferably, 
there should be members of the Commission who have a working 
knowledge of juvenile brain development, juvenile representation within 
the jurisdiction, and juvenile modes of incarceration within the 
jurisdiction. 
Miller Commissions as I have described herein would provide an 
additional path toward correcting the course of American juvenile 
justice. 
74. Id. at 2468.
75. As I have written about previously, a court or executive body cannot assess
whether an inmate has demonstrated growth and rehabilitation without examining the 
conditions of confinement the inmate endures. See Drinan, Graham on the Ground, supra 
note 25, at 78–81; Drinan, Misconstruing, supra note 25, at 793; see also Tamar 
Birckhead, Children in Isolation: The Solitary Confinement of Youth, 50 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. (forthcoming 2015), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2512867 (describing 
the most extreme type of confinement for youth, its reasons, and its harms).  
76. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (describing the widespread
elimination and narrowing of state parole provisions). 
77. Cara H. Drinan, Clemency in a Time of Crisis, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1123,
1152 (2012). 
78. Id. at 1154.
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CONCLUSION 
The Miller decision was capacious in its language, breadth, and 
vision. Already, some states have responded in ways that bode well for 
holistic juvenile justice reform. These responses suggest that the two 
proposals I make in this Article may be timely and achievable. 
Having said that, the proposals I make here are short-term solutions 
to long-term problems. There needs to be a national conversation about 
juvenile justice and how we deviated so far from the original concept of 
rehabilitation for juveniles. Only in the context of that conversation can 
we begin to unravel the many problems with the status quo and to 
implement the vision of the Miller Court. 
